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The specter of ethnic conflicts has ravaged both developed and developing countries and ethnic conflicts present a sustained challenge for theories on conflict management and resolution.​[1]​ This chapter considers ethnic conflicts as a bargaining situation between ethnic groups and governments, where commitment problems may prevent the parties from reaching settlements and encourage the use of violence. When parties in a conflict are unable to reach an agreement by themselves, an external enforcer who can help the parties overcome credible commitment problems and bear the cost of providing the settlement may be necessary to reach an arrangement.​[2]​ Since the inability to find settlement to violent ethnic conflicts can create severe regional security problems that can impose significant costs on external actors, external actors will often have incentives to facilitate a stable settlement in ethnic conflicts. However, if settlement is a collective good for more than one actor, then the actors may try to shirk and rely on others enforcing the settlement. In this paper, I use the theory of public goods provision to identify when third party provision will be more or less likely. I illustrate the implications of the argument with case studies of Sri Lanka and Bosnia. 

ETHNIC CONFLICT: VIOLENCE, SETTLEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT
In this chapter, I use the term ‘ethnic conflict’ to denote conflict within state involving communities which identify themselves as separate units with distinct cultural traits and historical experiences. In order for communities to become political actors they must be mobilized politically and develop a certain level of common identification as being somehow different. In this sense, ethnic conflicts are a subset of civil wars, which are not necessarily waged by distinct ethnic groups, but could also be based on ideological cleavages. The existence of multiple cultural communities does not by itself imply that conflict is inevitable, and conflictual relations between ethnic communities do not necessarily become violent. Indeed, despite examples of very violent conflict such as Bosnia, most relations between governments and ethnic groups see very limited if any violence (see e.g. Horowitz 1985 and Shehadi 1993). My interest here lies in accounting for when violent civil conflicts can be formally settled short of the use of force, for example by arrangements that permit ethnic groups to coexist within a single state, as in the case of Belgium or the divorce between the Czech and Slovak republics, or secede in ways that do undermine regional stability, as in the case of Former Yugoslavia. 
Ethnic conflicts could in principle be settled without violence in the same ways as other forms of conflict. However, ethnic conflicts exhibit certain characteristics that make them quite different from conflicts between states. In an ethnic conflict, the ethnic communities that do not control the state apparatus often lack much by way of an organized military or political apparatus, and also lack the legal standing afforded to states under international law. These characteristics matter for the prospects for providing feasible settlements in important ways. In ethnic conflicts where one of the actors is not a state, it will often be more difficult to substitute negotiated or political strategies for the use of violence. The empirical record clearly shows that whereas interstate wars usually end in negotiations rather than the complete defeat of the other parties, ethnic conflicts are much less likely to end in negotiations (see in particular Walter 1997:331). Many researchers attribute the difficulty in establishing negotiated settlement to a commitment problem: Since a government cannot credibly commit to refraining from cracking down on the rebels after peace agreements, rebels will be reluctant to decommission in the absence of guarantees. More generally, we have a commitment problem in that whatever guarantees that a socially and economically stronger group dominating the government makes to protect and respect the property rights of the minority ethnic group may not be fully credible (see e.g. Davies 1972 and Lumsden 1973). This applies even in cases where animosities have not escalated to violence. As such, the credible commitment problems with respects to majority consent to the future protection of minority rights can feed and sustain pre-existing cultural and ethnic animosities (Lake and Rothchild 1998:7). However, the asymmetry in political status between governments and ethnic groups also makes it much more difficult for the international community to intervene in ways that are effective to provide settlements without generating criticism from the government for violating its sovereignty.
	Whether the parties, themselves, to a conflict can reach a settlement depends on whether a state controlled by a majority ethnic group can credibly commit to offer future protection of the rights of a minority group. When conflicts become violent, as states cannot provide credible guarantees to protect the rights of minorities, external involvement can help establishing stable settlements, for example by establishing and monitoring cease-fire agreements and facilitate institutional arrangements that can improve the relationships between the majority and the minority ethnic groups.

EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT AND THE SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS
Why would external actors be willing to intervene in ethnic conflicts that occur in other states in the first place? An important reason stem from the fact that most ethnic conflicts are not isolated domestic events that affect only the state where the conflict occurs, but often affect neighboring states within a geographical-political region. Ethnic conflicts can spread or diffuse among states if the violence in one state directly expands to another state or the conflict creates externalities for other states through features such as refugee flows or adverse economic effects. Ethnic conflicts are particularly likely to diffuse when the neighboring states already experience related domestic ethnic tensions. A conflict in a neighboring country can then provide windows of opportunity and fertile strategic conditions for groups to pursue their goals by violent means. Ethnic conflict often becomes internationalized when other states in the area intervene on the side of one of the parties, as seen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 1998:23). Such interventions can in turn generate counter interventions from other parties with ties to the other side of the conflict.
	Ethnic conflicts can be destabilizing for other countries in a region, especially if groups have secessionist or irredentist claims, or neighboring countries have strong attachments to one of the parties or particular preferences over the terms of proposed settlements that may be incompatible with the views of other states. 
Ethnic conflicts may also spread through a demonstration effect, where other ethnic groups observe the mobilization process and then try to imitate successful movements (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 1998:28). Successful ethnic conflicts elsewhere often lead actors to change their estimates of the probability of successful revolts and the costs of involvement. This implies that unsolved ethnic conflicts can create security dilemmas even for states and ethnic groups within the larger region who have no stake in the original conflict (Posen 1993). Moreover, an ethnic conflict creates problems of migration to the neighboring countries, and socio-economic instability in the region as well.
	A stable settlement where parties refrain from violence would in this sense be a collective good for the region. Due to the commitment problem discussed above, the domestic parties to an ethnic conflict may be unable to implement negotiated settlements, and external actors can play an important role helping to enforce settlements. In the following section I expand on how external actors can help overcome the collective action problems in reaching a settlement to ethnic conflict. 

COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTERNAL ENFORCEMENT, AND THE SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS
When an ethnic conflict threatens to spread or create costly externalities neighboring countries have incentives in seeing a settlement to prevent further escalation. Under such circumstances, finding settlements to ethnic conflicts is akin to a public good for the surrounding countries in a region to the extent that reaching a settlement benefits the national interests of all the neighboring countries, regardless of whether individual countries participate or not in providing peace. 
The theory of public goods tell us that collective goods are likely to be underprovided since all actors will enjoy the benefit of the good regardless of whether or not they contribute to providing the good. Once the public good is provided, it cannot easily be withheld from actors who have not contributed. The immediate underprovision problem is further compounded by the long term underprovision problem to sustain an agreement, since more than one actor is necessary to create a truce or a temporary ceasefire. The ultimate goal in the settlement of an ethnic conflict is not merely to end the political violence, but to eradicate the conditions that led to such a costly level of conflict. However, changing the bargaining power among a government and ethnic minority groups and creating incentives for all domestic actors to abide by the agreed settlement cannot be typically achieved, unless an external actor (or actors) is willing to actively commit to the process for the long run. 
The settlement of an ethnic conflict requires a privileged actor or group of actors willing to bear the costs of enforcing a settlement by enacting policies that increase the cost of fighting for each participant; however, the benefits of such peace settlements cannot easily exclude states that do not contribute to facilitating or implementing a settlement. Potential external enforcers include both the major global powers as well as regional powers with more limited areas of national interest. Smaller regional powers tend to more actively intervene or to be involved in ethnic conflicts (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004), but they are usually not willing or able to sustain the burden of long-term intervention in ethnic conflict. Smaller regional powers also lack the economic and military resources to enforce a settlement between fighting groups. 
Intervention comes at a cost for enforcers. Due to the expected cost of the intervention and the security dilemma that ethnic conflicts create, major powers are more often than not reluctant to drastically alter the existing territorial structures (Heraclides 1990). ​[3]​ In addition, external actors often have difficulty to coordinate their policies and the settlement cannot be sustained or reached in the first place. Even in the post Cold-War system where the USA is the undisputed sole superpower, influential voices in US, such as Condoleezza Rice, argue that the USA cannot afford to intervene in every single secessionist ethnic conflict but must limit its position to a few key regions defined by the US national interest. 
Lemke (2002) argues that major powers within regions or “sub-hierarchies” behave locally in ways that are reminiscent of the major powers on the global stage. Even more important, a dominant country in the region that can bear higher costs than the rest of the countries might provide the settlement. However, if there are contenders for power with a region or sub-hierarchy, it will be extremely difficult for either one of them to assume the costs to support a given settlement without the consent of the remaining powers. Hence, the public good might not be provided or it is at best underprovided. By combining the model of settlements as a public good with Lemke’s theory of “sub-hierarchies”, I can derive the conditions under which the external actors can provide and sustain the settlement of an ethnic conflict as a public good. I also examine the role of the global power and whether it is willing to act as a privileged actor to enforce the agreement when the regional powers fail to do so. 
The following section presents the theoretical model of the settlement of ethnic conflicts as a collective action problem. The model analyzes the inherent problems of providing the collective good (in this case the settlement of the ethnic conflict). This model is applicable for either a major regional power or a major international power decides to intervene and settle an ethnic dispute. I then illustrate the insights from the model by contrasting the cases of Sri Lanka, where the regional power (India) did make an effort to play the role of an enforcer, and Bosnia, where the leading regional power (the European Union) came with feasible plans to settle the dispute (e.g. Carrington proposal) but failed to assume the cost of the enforcement. 

THE SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS AS A COLLECTIVE GOOD
 This model assumes a case of ethnic conflict where the international community or a major power is trying to press for negotiations and end the conflict. The settlement problem, which is modeled here, considers two actors, the leading country of the global hierarchy (i) and the dominant country of the sub-hierarchy (j). The purpose of the external intervention is to reach a settlement that reduces the domestic actors’ discount factor for continuing violence in the future. For the settlement to be successful the majority group has to be pressured to offer a credible arrangement to the minority group(s). 
The model is based on the public good game presented and analyzed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995:333-36). Each player is aware of the benefits derived from the provision of the public good, but he(she) does not know what level of costs the other players can afford to provide the public good, in this case to sustain a settlement in an ethnic conflict. Thus, the actors have to signal their level of commitment by the costs that they can carry to provide the public good. The actors have to update their beliefs, and the equilibrium outcome is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) that satisfies all the conditions of incomplete-information games with independent types.
The key point in this chapter is that settlements require sustainable provision. In the case that the major neighboring countries or a major power of the local sub-hierarchy fails to bear the cost of providing the settlement, the enforcer of the last resort will be the global power, currently the United States. The preference to constrain the degree of disturbances in the international system depends on the position of the external actors in the international system and their strategic perceptions on how the emerging crisis may affect their interests. In the two examples, both India and the European Union experienced significant negative externalities from the respective ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These externalities motivated their interest to enforce a settlement that will put an end to the regional disturbance. 
	This game has two stages. Both players decide simultaneously whether they will move to a settlement or not at period t=0 or period t=1. The two time periods represent the two stages of the game. The actors’ decision to contribute to the provision of the public good is a dichotomous choice. Either they bear the costs of providing the settlement or they refuse to enter any negotiation process and support a settlement. The payoffs in each period are clear: 1 if at least one of the players provides the public good and 0 if none does. Each player has a constant cost function - for the global power and for the leader of the local sub-hierarchy - where  and are functions representing the cost of involvement for the external actors in terms of human lives, political, and economic resources. Their cost remains the same in both periods (stages). Although both players are aware of the benefits they derive from the provision of the public good, they are unaware of each other's cost function. Both players believe that their costs are drawn independently from the same continuous and strictly increasing distribution function P(.) on , where .​[4]​ The cost function represents the actor's type. Some actors are willing or able to sustain higher costs than others. The goal for each actor is to maximize the net benefits derived from the public good, irrespectively of who provides it. The actors choose strategies to maximize their expected benefits, given their cost function.
	 Given the actors’ choice at the first stage of the game (i.e., whether they contribute to the settlement or not) the game has three possible scenarios for the second stage:
	(1) Neither actor provides the public good in the first period: Both players then know that the cost of the other player exceeds their cutoff cost, and ĉ for the dominant country of the global hierarchy (i) and the dominant country in the local sub-hierarchy (j) respectively. If the cost for providing the settlement is lower than the cutoff cost, the probability that either actor will support the settlement changes in the second period. The actors will support the settlement in the second stage. This shows that the level of the cost, depending on the cutoff point for each player, determines the choices during the second stage on whether actors will support a settlement.
	(2) Both players contribute during the first period: In the first period a type  that is willing to carry higher costs than the cut off costs will signal its ability to sustain higher costs in order to achieve and sustain a more favorable settlement and higher contributions by the other players. 
	(3) Only one player contributes: Suppose a situation where the dominant global power contributes resources to support the settlement in the first period, while in the local sub-hierarchy the major power(s) does not. The important element in this case is whether it is worth for the actors to reveal their type. Even if the global power is a type  or has a strong willingness to contribute exceeding the cut off costs of not providing the settlement, it will only support a settlement if the likelihood that the regional power provides the settlement is less than. Thus, there are two possibilities. Either, the global power is willing to support a settlement and bear the costs in the next stage; or the regional power(s) have low tolerance to casualties and other forms of cost and do not support a settlement in the second stage. In the latter case, it is better for the global power not to contribute in the first period and at the same time signal a high cost in the first period. By not contributing in the first period the global power will induce the regional power(s) to contribute in the second period. However, if the global power is willing to contribute in the first period and it is willing to compromise, regional actors will be more reluctant to contribute any resources to the settlement in the second period unless they are willing to bear high costs.
	There are two main theoretical implications of this model. First, the critical aspect is the cost functions of the actors. The actors, either the global power or the local sub-hierarchy power(s), have to accept certain costs in order to provide the public good, in this case a settlement. Second, it is beneficial for the actors to signal that they have high costs and they are unwilling to contribute the collective good, in an effort to force other actors to compromise and contribute as well. The second proposition is controversial, as it suggests that in certain cases no external intervention will occur, regardless of how extreme the ethnic conflict may be (see Sudan or Congo). Moreover, it implies that the United States may be willing to have the major powers of the local sub-hierarchy act on their behalf rather than intervening directly. The role of the United States as a global power becomes critical in cases where the settlement is not provided or where the settlement is provided by an actor who has an interest to signal high costs in order to avoid total provision of the collective good in the second round. 
	Once, the global power decides to actively intervene, the game re-starts again. The public good game explains under what conditions the globally dominant power is going to make a pro-intervention choice. These conditions can be provided by the theory of the sub-hierarchies that delineate the interaction between the dominant power and the various local sub-hierarchies. First of all, if the United States perceives the situation as threatening to international stability, hence it is of high salience to intervene and facilitate the enforcement of a settlement.​[5]​ Second, there are significant spillover effects from the continuation of the conflict that involves sub-hierarchies in which major allies of the United States are involved (e.g. Balkans). The third condition relates to the possibility of involvement in other sub-hierarchies (such as Africa and Central Asia). In that case the choice of the United States could be to work with the dominant country of that region or the major contender within that region, depending on its national interests. The implication of these conditions is that if they are not met, there are few reasons for the United States to intervene to facilitate the resolution of a conflict as the following cases illustrate.

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: SRI LANKA AND BOSNIA
In this section I illustrate the model by contrasting the cases of Sri Lanka and Bosnia. Contemporary Sri Lanka has a Buddhist Sinhalese majority that constitutes 74 % of the population and a Hindu Tamils minority of about 12% of the population, located mainly in the northern and eastern parts of the island. Sri Lanka is almost a textbook example of the commitment problem inducing violent ethnic conflict and the regional problems ethnic conflicts can create. The prior constitutional provisions by the British, the Soulbery Constitution of 1946, guaranteed the political and economic rights of the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. During the 1970’s the nationalism of the Sinhalese population rose. The Sinhala majority moved steadily toward reducing the socio-economic benefits of the Tamils, and decided to define the multiethnic society of Sri Lanka as a Sinhala-Buddhist state. Special privileges were assigned to both the language and the religion of the Sinhalese majority. Educational and employment quotas were institutionalized at the expense of the Tamils. When their demands for more democratic representation did not work out the Tamils requested autonomy and new political structures. The strife started soon after, leading to political violence against the Tamils in 1983 (see Jeyaratman, 1988).
The ethnic strife in Sri Lanka seriously affected the region. The migration of the 100,000 Tamil refugees to Tamil Nadu in South India created severe problems in Indian politics that eventually resulted in the assassination of Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi in 1989. Moreover, there was extended fear in the region that the conflict in Sri Lanka could trigger ethnic movements in Bangladesh with Chakma minority as well as in Nepal, which faced civil unrest by groups sympathetic to India. The involvement of India in 1987 led to the Provisional Councils Act and the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. These provided India with the leverage to deal with Sri Lanka on a bilateral basis, avoiding any interference from possible contenders like Pakistan. The external involvement to bring a peaceful settlement failed, however, because India was not able or willing to further commit to the proposed settlement of 1987. The failure of India to enforce such a settlement in 1987 is illustrative not only of the enormous costs that the enforcer has to suffer, but also of the difficulties involved in such an endeavor. 
Whereas, in the case of Sri Lanka, it was India, the major regional power in South-East Asia, which assumed the burden to enforce the proposed settlement in 1987, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the role of the United States as the global dominant power became critical to provide the collective good of a settlement. In Bosnia, where the war was relentlessly continuing, the then UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd went to Washington with the clear message for the United States to be involved in the resolution of the conflict. That movement brought the creation of the Contact Group. Although it is widely asserted that the aggressive deployment of NATO air-power against the Bosnian Serbs and the military ground offensive of Croats on August 1995 contributed to the final agreement at Dayton, Ohio, it can not be ignored the fact that the United States for the first time accepted a 51-49 per cent geographical split and administrative autonomy for the Bosnian Serbs. The final agreement at Dayton, Ohio and the subsequent Treaty of Paris were the outcomes of coordination efforts both at the diplomatic and the military level led by the United States (Neville-Jones, 1996-97). Contrary to the conflict in Sri Lanka, in Bosnia the enforced settlement, despite its limitations, addressed issues of constitutional autonomy and territorial division to the direction of the minority ethnic group, the Bosnian Serbs.​[6]​ 
After World War II, Bosnia’s three national groups were more or less equally represented in Yugoslavia’s decision-making structures. The economic and social decline of Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz Tito encouraged the rise of ethnic nationalism. In the 1990 elections nationalists gained power in the Yugoslav republics. Soon after the elections of fall 1991, military clashes erupted between the Yugoslav People’s Army and forces controlled by Slovenia and Croatia. Following such clashes the United Nations and the European Community recognized the dissolution of Yugoslavia and also the independent republics as its successors. In spring 1992 the conflict spread to Bosnia, as the Bosnian Muslim government was trying to obtain control within the internationally accepted territory of Bosnia.​[7]​ Bosnian Serbs became a majority within Yugoslavia and minority within Bosnia. On the other hand, despite their minority status Bosnian Serbs controlled substantial amounts of socio-economic resources, while the Bosnian Muslims had the political control. This is the case of an ethnic conflict where both parties had to be forced to provide the collective good, nevertheless, the Bosnian Muslims were the ones, having the political control, to agree to a settlement that protects the future property and civil rights of the Bosnian Serbs.
	During the early stages of the conflict, the Serbian forces were slightly stronger and far more homogenous, while the Bosnian Muslims had fewer resources to commit to the fight than the Bosnian Serbs. The rest of the actors, including the international actors, were weak, uncommitted, and/or scattered between the two extremes. The more committed Serbs could drive the bargaining region closer to their most preferred outcome. Nevertheless, for a brief period during 1994, there was small variability in the range of feasible outcomes. If an agreement had been adopted by the United States and the other international actors at that time, the Serbs would have been willing to accept settlements that have been closer to the preferences of the United States and the Bosnian government than the prevailing agreement. Thus, a stable and beneficial outcome for the Bosnian Muslims could have emerged (Friedman and Gizelis 1997, Economist 1994: 43-44). From March 1994 to July 1995 the bargaining power of the Bosnian Serbs, who demanded half of the land and political autonomy, increased steadily.​[8]​ Hence, up until 1994 the European Union with the Geneva talks and the ground UN forces (UNPROFOR) were struggling to reach an agreement between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The negotiation process was at a stalemate, as the Bosnian Serbs rejected the international community’s proposed settlements (e.g. the Vance and Owen plans).
	The failure of the European Union as the major regional power to reach an agreement was not because of lack of plans (plans Vance-Owen, Carrington), but because of its default to act as an enforcer and bear the necessary costs involved in a military and a diplomatic intervention to impose on all sides such a settlement. The negotiation process took a new turn when the international actors, primarily the United States, conceded to modifications of the status quo and committed more resources to enforce the proposed settlement.​[9]​ Most external actors accepted an arrangement that would divide Bosnia into two regions of almost equal size between the Croat-Muslim coalition and the Serbs. Furthermore, each group would enjoy a certain degree of political autonomy. The peaceful settlement became feasible only when the United States committed more resources to support the negotiation process and it actively pressured the Serbs through bombing and sanctions on Federal Yugoslav Republic (FYR) and exercised diplomatic pressure on Bosnian Muslims (see Neville-Jones, 1996-1997: 45-46). The final settlement, established by the treaty signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, divided the territory of Bosnia equally between the Croat-Muslim federation and the Bosnian Serbs, and each community would maintain limited self-administrative privileges. A key component in the territorial division of the land was the guarantee of the Gorazde corridor in the North that unites the two parts of the Bosnian Serbs who feared being isolated from each other, hence weaker in case of a military emergency.




In the post-Cold War the trends in international relations have created even more regional sensitivities to ethnic groups. The spillover effects of migration, refugees, and the threat to the stability of different geographic regions are intensified in the post-Cold War era. For this reason the settlement of an ethnic conflict is treated as a public good, especially for each local regional hierarchy. The concept of public good allows for problems of collective action to be analyzed and it does not preclude the possible problems that emerge from lack of commitment from the external actors. 
	Settling an ethnic conflict requires commitment and willingness to bear the costs of the enforced settlement. This chapter presents a theoretical framework combining game theory with Lemke’s theory of sub-hierarchies in international relations, which explores the conditions under which a settlement can be provided. 	This chapter has also significant implications for international relations as it identifies the conditions under which the United States, as the major global power, or the local dominant power, if there is one, may be willing to intervene in an ethnic conflict. It offers also an explanation of why in some cases, such as Somalia or Sudan, the Untied States was a lukewarm participant at best, whereas in the case of Haiti or Bosnia the United States was directly and decisively involved. 
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^1	  Recent studies that examine the impact of ethnic conflicts on international relations include Heraclides (1990), Fearon (1998), Lake and Rothchild (1996), and Saideman (1997). Zartman (1985) was one of the first scholars who examined the settlement of secessionist conflicts as a problem of finding negotiated agreements. Earlier studies on ethnic conflicts include Suhrke and Noble (1977) and Shiel (1984).
^2	  For the significance of the external party as an enforcer see Walter (1997, 2002).
^3	  During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and the United States were careful not to antagonize each other in the case of ethnic conflicts within each other's jurisdiction, although the United States had a more consistent record in that respect compared to the Soviet Union.
^4	  Cost in the case of a settlement consists of financial and military resources, as well as, political ones. 
^5	  The lack of commitment by the United States in maintaining stability in Somalia gave the impression of a weak and uncommitted superpower. The leaders of Haiti inferred, from the prior failed engagement of the United States in Somalia, that the United States was not willing to assume any costs of involvement in Haiti. In the course of action they miscalculated.
^6	  The Bosnian conflict has also elements of both a secessionist and an irredentist ethnic conflict. But only the first attribute is of primary interest in this chapter.
^7	  Warfare ensued as the Bosnian government, controlled by Bosnian Muslims, sought to reestablish control over its internationally recognized borders. During the early stages of the war the Bosnian Serbs gained control over approximately 70 percent of Bosnia. The remainder of the territory was divided between the Croats and the Muslims, who subsequently established a loose federation.
^8	  Although at the battlefield the Serbs experienced military defeats to the extent that the distribution of power was rather equal by 1995, in terms of bargaining power they were able to hold their positions. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims and the international community grew pessimistic and more flexible in their positions. 
^9	  During the early stages of the conflict the United States, the most important external actor, insisted that Bosnia remain a unified state, under the internationally recognized government and borders. To attain a settlement the United States had to concede to some of the Bosnian Serbs' demands.
^10	  The international community, especially the United States, was initially unwilling to offer a settlement acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs. On multiple occasions, the European members of the 'contact group' were closed to reach an agreement between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs. Moreover, the Russians all along supported a rather moderate settlement similar to the final Dayton agreement, which could have been acceptable by the Bosnian Serbs. To all of these efforts US response was at best lukewarm. Thus, no agreement was reached over a relatively long period of time, while the conflict was prolonged. The international actors misperceived the resolve of the secessionist ethnic group (Boyd 1995, Glitman 1996-97.) Since 1995 there was a progressive shift in the United States’ policies without any commitment to enforce any settlement.
